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Bringing financial regulation back down to earth 
 
Howard Davies, Can Financial Markets Be Controlled? Cambridge: Polity, 2015, (ISBN: 
9780745688312), 136pp.  
 
and 
 
Nicholas Dorn, Democracy and Diversity in Financial Market Regulation 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, (ISBN:  9780415712170), 182pp. 
 
Reviewed by Nathan Coombs, University of Edinburgh 
 
Even after the crisis of 2007-08 demonstrated the importance of finance for employment and 
economic growth, scholarly writing on financial regulation often remains bound by narrow 
disciplinary conventions. Legal scholars have discussed how attempts to mitigate systemic risk 
in the financial system are being embedded within Europe’s supervisory mechanisms 
(Wymeersch, Hopt, and Ferrarini, 2012). Political economists have stayed with their traditional 
concern with questions of order and change when asking whether new regulatory thinking after 
the crisis signals a turn towards greater political accountability (Pagliari, Zimmerman, and 
Helleiner 2010). Generally missing are engagements with financial regulation of sufficient 
scope to inform the work of researchers in adjacent disciplines. The situation is crying out for 
change. As the effects of financialization (Lapavitsas 2011; Zwan 2014) have emerged as a 
productive area of research for sociologists of work and employment (Thompson 2013; 
Darcillon 2015), regulation remains one of the last aspects of finance yet to be brought into the 
emerging interdisciplinary dialogue. The result is that while sociologists have theorised the 
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potential of regulatory reform to achieve new articulations of finance and society (Walby 
2013), such work still lacks a fine-grained appreciation for the complexities of global financial 
regulation. In this sense, Howard Davies’s and Nicholas Dorn’s books are potentially valuable 
contributions to the literature. Davies, a veteran technocrat and renowned regulatory scholar, 
titles his book Can Financial Markets Be Controlled? Dorn, a legal sociologist, has no less 
ambition with his book Democracy and Diversity in Financial Market Regulation. Both authors 
speak to the need for fundamental thinking about the regulatory enterprise from a perspective 
sensitive to its legal and institutional minutiae. But does either text live up to its promise?  
Released on Polity’s mass-market Global Future Series, Davies’s book attempts to 
make debates about the future of financial regulation accessible to the lay reader. Although 
regulation is never going to be as exciting a subject as rogue traders or bond market 
shenanigans, it still has all the right elements for a good story – political intrigue, conflicts of 
interest, and colossal amounts of money at stake. In the prologue, Davies reminds us of the pre-
crisis world in which financiers were courted by the great and the good, and when regulators 
who dared question the sector’s practices were routinely chastised by politicians. Once having 
set the scene, the following chapters then give a judicious account of the causes and 
consequences of the crisis. Davies locates the roots of the crisis in the new global regime of 
accumulation arising from East Asian countries with a trade surplus to invest and Western 
countries taking on excessive debt in order to prop up their faltering economies. These global 
systemic trends were compounded by a conjunction of failures in the regulatory sphere: over-
leveraged banks operating with low capital reserves; consolidation between commercial and 
investment banks in the United States with the demise of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act; a lack 
of transparency with the growth in over-the-counter markets in derivatives; and central 
bankers’ misplaced fixation on inflation targeting. The reliance of central bankers on Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium models and their belief in the efficient market hypothesis (the 
3 
 
conviction that markets price assets at their value/risk) only worsened their complacency (see 
also Engelen et al. 2011).  
Where these early chapters give a good summary of explanations for the crisis, the later 
chapters reflect on the difficulties of regulatory reform. Davies identifies three main problems. 
First, he notes only limited movement towards global regulatory convergence since the crisis, 
leaving open the potential for regulatory arbitrage (where financial firms capitalize on cross-
national regulatory discrepancies). Second, Davies criticises the fragmentation of regulatory 
institutions within the European Union and the United States. Third, he sees tension in 
regulatory responses between measures to increase market discipline and those directed 
towards a more tightly controlled regulatory regime. Indeed, for Davies the fundamental 
conflict between market and state is pervasive in post-crisis regulatory reform and indicates an 
‘unstable equilibrium which contains the seeds of its own destruction.’ (74) Whether or not one 
agrees with this pessimistic prognosis, the book is to be commended for achieving an overview 
of developments in financial regulation without becoming bogged down in the technicalities. 
And yet, at no point does Davies discern the potential for a fundamentally different approach 
to regulation. Sociologists seeking insight into how regulatory mechanisms might serve to 
bring finance to democratic account will therefore struggle to find inspiration here. 
Although aspiring towards a similar level of comprehensiveness, Dorn’s book differs 
from Davies’s in both style and substance. Drawing from legal, political, anthropological and 
sociological scholarship, the thread which ties together Dorn’s book is a counter-intuitive, 
normative argument which advocates achieving greater political accountability in financial 
rule-making by moving away from the commitment to global regulatory convergence. In its 
place, he instead advocates greater national and regional legal pluralism achieved via 
politicising and democratising financial regulation. This Dorn presents as a win-win 
proposition. Not only will localised forms of democratic engagement in setting the principles 
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of financial regulation address the vicissitudes of technocratic group-think; it will also help 
mitigate global contagion in the event of another crisis. Democracy and diversity will achieve 
these desirable results because the global harmonisation of regulatory requirements is, in 
Dorn’s view, responsible for creating a frictionless, capital-mobile environment allowing risks 
to be quickly transmitted across national borders. Regulatory divergence, on the other hand, 
can provide a buffer against risk transmission. 
The book addresses issues connected to its central argument over three parts. The first, 
on historical legacies, seeks to deconstruct the rhetorical parameters of existing debates about 
financial regulation. Intending to expose regulation as essentially self-regulation behind a 
public façade, Dorn elaborates its historical and political origins in the City of London. 
Following this, he then criticises the idea of ‘too connected to fail’ (TCTF) – an idea which 
gained considerable currency during the financial crisis and served to support public bailouts 
of banks. By contrasting recent experiences with responses to events such as the collapse of 
the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in the 1990s, Dorn calls into question TCTF’s 
status as received wisdom. The second part, on regulatory hubris, tackles an assortment of 
issues concerning regulatory forbearance, regulatory arbitrage, and the move from modelling-
oriented to judgement-based regulation. His central argument is then put to the test in chapter 
four by making the case for less integration of financial regulation in the European Union. The 
third section, on ways forward, engages data-centric approaches to achieving market 
transparency being adopted by regulators since the crisis. Echoing work by Riles (2013), Dorn 
represents these measures as a hubristic attempt to achieve panoptical regulatory vision, which 
only serves to distract attention away from the more pressing issue of devising efficacious 
means of bank resolution. The final chapter concludes by seeking to demonstrate how only 
democratic involvement in financial regulation provides the solution to achieving financial 
stability.    
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Like Davies’s book, Dorn’s is a compelling introduction to the state of the art in global 
financial regulation which succeeds in sustaining the reader’s interest through its sometimes 
labyrinthine material. Dorn pulls off that rare feat of presenting an argument capable of eliciting 
the interest of interdisciplinary researchers whilst also being grounded in an appreciation for 
the intricacies of the regulatory sphere. However, neither Davies nor Dorn offer clear solutions 
for how regulation might reign in financialization or resolve the dysfunctional relationship 
between employer objectives in work and employment (as proposed by Thompson’s (2013) 
‘disconnected capitalism’ thesis). Bringing financial regulation back down to earth so that it 
can address pressing problems in the ‘real’ economy remains something that sociologists of 
work and employment will have to take the lead in theorising. Yet by demystifying the elite 
discourses of global financial regulation both books may serve as accessible points of entry 
into the field for scholars interested in and breaking free from existing disciplinary constraints. 
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